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The notion of growth is one of the most studied notions within economic theory and, 
traditionally, it is accounted for on the basis of a positivist thesis according to which 
assumptions are not relevant, as long as economic models have acceptable predictive power. 
Following this view, it does not matter whether assumptions are realistic or not. Arguments 
against this principle may involve a defense of the realistic assumptions over highly idealized 
or false ones. This article aims in a different direction. Instead of demanding more realism, 
we can accept the spirit of the mentioned thesis, but, instead, criticize the circularity that may 
arise by combining different assumptions that are necessary for the explanation of economic 
growth in mainstream economics. Such a circularity is a key aspect of the well-known 
problem of providing microfoundations for macroeconomic properties. It is here suggested 
that the notion of emergence could be appropriate to arrive at a better understanding of 
growth, clarifying the issues related to circularity, but without totally rejecting the usefulness 
of unrealistic assumptions.  
 






According to traditional positive economics, the realism of the assumptions that sustain 
economic models does not matter; what matters is the model’s predictive power. If a model 
generates empirically adequate predictions, it can be accepted, even on the basis of 
implausible assumptions. According to different arguments, in favor of and against the 
project of positive economics, it is assumed that theories are postulated in relative 
independence of other theories in the field. Usually, each proposed theory is defended, 
examined and criticized in its own light. But what occurs when we consider related theories 
simultaneously? (One anonymous referee motivated me to consider this matter, highlighting 
its relation to the present work.) 
I will focus on the mainstream, general model of macroeconomic growth in light of 
traditional, microeconomic price theory, granting that both can be rendered as plausible by 
2 
 
positivist standards if evaluated within their respective contexts. As is well known, a 
circularity problem may appear. On the one hand it is assumed, according to the general 
neoclassical model of economic growth, that the values of capital and labor determine, as 
inputs, the value of production. But, on the other hand, price theory implies that production 
determines the value of capital and labor. This explanatory circularity seems to raise a 
particular issue for positive economics, which is, in a certain sense, orthogonal to concerns 
over the irrelevance of assumptions, I will argue, mainly because it only arises when trying 
to form a coherent picture of a complex, interrelated set of social phenomena. 
If the mentioned circularity is vicious, it would be seriously problematic for the field. At a 
minimum, it would mean that there are core elements of economic phenomena that 
mainstream economists are not explaining, regardless of the empirical adequacy of the 
individual theories in their specific domains. I propose a different diagnose. I will show that 
the notions of epistemic context and contextual emergence, taken together, help us make 
sense of what is going on with the apparent circularity in an epistemically fruitful manner. 
On the basis of the notion of an epistemic context, I will argue that specific explanatory 
models must be understood as operating within projects of inquiry, which may include not 
only detailed descriptions of phenomena, but also normative and nominative commitments. 
Epistemic contexts may be compared to Kuhnian paradigms; they are based on sociological 
grounds and are constituted by habits, which clearly have normative aspects. A crucial 
difference between both notions, however, is that epistemic contexts should be conceived as 
more general. Every Kuhnian paradigm is an epistemic context, but not every epistemic 
context is a paradigm. Anyway, I prefer not to engage in a detailed comparison now. 
According to the notion of contextual emergence, I hold that emergent properties are 
reducible in some epistemic contexts and irreducible in others. Additionally, there must be a 
context in which it is possible to explain the new properties as correlates of abrupt changes 
in complexity at the underlying level of the system that is being investigated. 
Adopting this proposal, as I would like to show, the circularity between macroeconomic 
growth theory and microeconomic price theory can be understood as an instance of the idea 
that each theory may just be part of a more general epistemic context. From a broader 
perspective, they may constitute the characterization of emergent, multi-level economic 
phenomena. At some stages of such a characterization, the action of individual agents could 
be seen as aggregating up into processes that ground a notion of economic growth that is 
recognizable at the collective level. But this need not be considered problematic, as long as 
it is acknowledged that every research project is always context-dependent. Contexts that are 
mainly focused on aggregation may turn out to be extremely reductionistic and could involve 
normative aspects that are fundamentally associated with social control and economic policy. 
These are contextual features that should be made explicit. When we continue to take 
multiple contexts into account, we gain a richer set of insights into the core phenomena. 
As mentioned above, I would like to focus on the notion of economic growth in order to 
show how the irrelevance thesis grounds its neoclassical interpretation. This is the topic of 
the third section. Before doing this, the main theses of neoclassical positive economics are 
introduced in Section 2. Section 3 is about economic growth. In Section 4, I consider the 
problem of circularity associated with the general form of neoclassical growth models. Then, 
in the fifth section, it is argued in which sense the issue can be considered as a problem of 
vicious circularity rather than as an unproblematic one. Actually, I try to show that it is a 
problem for a positivist economic perspective (or at least for its reductionistic versions), a 
perspective that neoclassical theory is supposed to defend. As explained, the problem of 
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circularity is deeply connected to the well-known problem of the microfoundations of 
macroeconomic properties (Section 5). According to the contextual notion of emergent 
property that I propose, we are able to express, for instance, how neoclassical models of 
growth, constructed on the basis of unrealistic assumptions, may be compatible with broader 
perspectives. Some of those assumptions are pointed out in Section 6 and considered under 
a proposal on emergence. Finally, in Section 7, I suggest how the problem of the 
microfoundations can be accounted for on the basis of a contextualist notion of emergence, 
which seems to be fully compatible with a non-reductionist branch of economic positivism.   
 
 
2. Positive economics and the irrelevance of assumptions 
 
In this section, I will focus on the importance of positivist principles within economic theory 
in order to prepare the way for a discussion on two interrelated, conceptual tensions in 
philosophy of economics (and, perhaps, within economic theory in general) that have not 
been clarified satisfactorily yet. The first is the tension between the poorly understood notion 
of economic growth and the idea of positive economics; the second, between 
macroeconomics and microeconomics. It seems impossible to propose a general way of 
solving the second tension without considering the first.  
In this article, the neoclassical notion of economic growth will be one of the main points 
of focus, considering that it has played a crucial role supporting economic positivism. The 
importance of economic growth and of positive economics is going to be acknowledged. In 
general, economic positivism provides methodological foundations that support economics 
as a scientific discipline. No scientific theory can be successful if there are unclarities about 
its empirical contrastability and positivism is a way that contributes to achieving and 
maintaining that success. And the concept of economic growth is a great example of how 
positivist economic theory can be very successful in some respects but still unsatisfactory 
regarding others. Of course, this is no reason to reject either economic positivism or the 
notion of economic growth. But it is a good reason to criticize both. And if we want to secure 
empirical adequacy of economic theory, there are good reasons to criticize economic 
positivism from a positivist perspective.  
As mentioned above, there is a tension between microeconomics and macroeconomics. 
The reasons for this tension being diverse, economic growth represents one of the central 
points of friction. Do economies grow as firms? If they do not, on what depends such a 
difference? We might be tempted to criticize the distinction between the macro and the micro 
in economics. But there are good reasons to maintain it. After all, the phenomena studied by 
microeconomics are distinct from macroeconomic phenomena. Both fields are focused on 
different types of phenomena, which exhibit different functions and structures. A more 
interesting criticism is the one about how the micro and the macro interact. And such a 
criticism can also maintain a positivist spirit.  
The traditional distinction between the notions of positive and normative economics can 
be traced back to the work of John Neville Keynes (1891), who proposed it emphasizing its 
importance for the avoidance of misconceptions. These notions may be characterized as 
follows:  
 
(2.1) Positive economics. A body of systematized economic knowledge can be considered 




(2.2) Normative economics. A body of systematized economic knowledge can be 
considered as normative economics if it is concerned with rules and means to achieve 
certain economic ends. 
 
There are, of course, many kinds of interactions between these both fields. On the one hand, 
when economists and politicians want to find rules of action to solve economic issues, they 
have to consider economic facts carefully. On the other hand, the ways in which economists 
describe economic processes may be influenced by the relevance of the social problems to 
which they might want to apply those descriptions. However, it is commonly accepted that 
the influence of positive economics in normative economics is (or should be) more 
substantial than the influence in the opposite direction. This can be supported by a well-
known strategy of Milton Friedman’s (1953) account on positive economics. The strategy is 
expressed in the following thesis:  
 
(2.3) Irrelevance of assumptions. Positive economic theories should not be evaluated with 
regard to their assumptions but with regard to their predictions. 
 
According to Friedman, economic theories should be judged considering a class of 
phenomena that needs explanation. Good theories are the ones that have great predictive 
power for a given class of phenomena, even if they are based on unrealistic assumptions. 
Factual evidence, according to this perspective, is characterized in terms of a correspondence 
between predictions and experience. This is crucial, not only to understand the distinction 
between positive and normative economics, but also to understand in which sense positive 
economics is considered as more fundamental than normative economics: We should prefer 
theories of high predictive power as means to achieve our economic ends. And supposedly, 
these economic ends do not determine what a good theory is. Of course, the evaluation of an 
economic theory should depend on epistemic and methodological criteria, which, as such, 
are considered as means to epistemic ends. But this does not imply, following the traditional 
positivistic account, that particular economic ends determine such evaluations or criteria.  
Friedman’s argument to defend the irrelevance thesis (2.3) could be schematized as 
follows (cf. Hausman 2008):  
 
(2.4) Irrelevance argument 
a) The aim of economic theories is to explain or predict relevant economic phenomena 
and they should be evaluated considering how they satisfy this aim (Economic 
positivism). 
b) The only relevant phenomena that economic theory should explain or predict are 
choices and consequences of choices, particularly for market quantities.  
c) Only data about choices and consequences of choices are relevant for the evaluation of 
an economic theory.  
d) If an economic theory provides, on the basis of unrealistic assumptions, correct 
predictions and explanations about choices and consequences of choices, it could still be 
considered a good theory (i.e. a theory that satisfies its role). 
 
Note that the irrelevance of assumptions depends, according to Friedman’s story, on a 
methodological restriction about how to approach phenomena (a focus on prediction and 
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explanation) and also on a restriction about what are the (relevant) phenomena. These 
restrictions characterize what we may call reductive economic positivism:  
 
(2.5) Reductive economic positivism. The only aim of economics is to explain or predict 
microeconomic phenomena, understanding prediction and explanation in terms of logical 
deduction (or other kind of inference) from fundamental economic facts.  
 
What is positivism in economics is as unclear as what is positivism in general. Many kinds 
of positivist perspectives have been defended since Laplace and Comte, leading sometimes 
to misunderstood controversies. Maybe the main problem that positivism has faced in its 
different forms is the one of seeking an appropriate account about the relations between 
experience and the rational principles with which we organize it. One of the best attempts to 
tackle this issue systematically was made by the logical positivists, also called logical 
empiricists (cf. Carnap 1928; Neurath 1931). I will not focus on the differences between the 
terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism”. Although both are usually acceptable 
to name the same school, distinctions might be important for a historical and deeper study of 
the perspectives defended by its members (cf. Uebel 2013). Anyway, notably, their principles 
demanded theories to be not only testable with experience, but also logically rigorous, 
conceptually clear and compatible with scientific unity. While the program of logical 
positivism has suffered severe criticisms and non-empiricist, alternative epistemological 
approaches have been developed very plausibly, it is still acceptable to think that the 
mentioned criteria should be, as such, considered as satisfiable by any good empirical theory 
in general. As alternatives, we may think of falsificationsm, historicism, constructivism or 
critical theory. But a detailed comparison between them is far beyond the scope of the present 
work, even if such a task is crucial for a complete epistemological account of economics. I 
do not focus here on positivism under the supposition that it is the best of those alternatives, 
but rather because I am interested in the positivist foundations of positivist economics. On 
this basis, we can formulate positivism (regarding theories) like this:  
 
(2.6) Positivism. Any empirical theory should satisfy the following conditions. 
2.6.1 It must be testable with experience, observation and measurements, e.g. through 
methods of corroboration and refutation. 
2.6.2 It must be formally expressible on the basis of logical principles, including axioms 
and rules of inference, but not restricted to any logic in particular. 
2.6.3 Its models must be constituted as conceptually clear and empirically plausible 
interpretations, associated with well characterized ontologies. 
2.6.4 It must be embedded in a coherent and unified scientific framework. 
 
Some comments on the conditions of this definition might be convenient. First, avoiding the 
restriction to a particular logic in 2.6.2, we are able to consider theories and models as open 
formal systems and not only as deductively closed systems. Perhaps one of the main problems 
of 20th century logical positivism was its restriction associated with classical logic. 
Regarding condition 2.6.3, note that there is another point of dissimilarity between this 
formulation of positivism and logical positivism as it is classically understood, i.e. as being 
opposed to metaphysical thinking. However, as clearly pointed out by Herbert Feigl, “the 
positivistic critique of metaphysics is primarily an attack upon confusions of meanings and 
is not intended as a wholesale repudiation of what has been presented under that label. In 
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point of fact, ‘metaphysics’ has been used in such a wide variety of ways that here also a 
little logical analysis of meanings is indispensable” (1943, p. 384). And having unification 
in mind (2.6.4), the kind of coherence demanded here must not strictly be logical consistency 
but could be some sort of pragmatic compatibility (cf. Chang 2017). In this sense, the 
proposal might be extended, for the case of the social sciences, to seek also cultural, political, 
ecological and ethical coherence. 
Now, the question that should be asked is whether neoclassical economic positivism 
adjusts to these general positivist criteria. As shown in the present work, it does not. The 
main reason is that it does not seem to satisfy conditions 2.6.3 and 2.6.4. This should become 
clear later. For my purposes, the following condition for economic positivism should be 
considered as sufficiently close to the neoclassical school:  
 
(2.7) The main aim of economics is to explain and predict economic phenomena.  
 
Note the openness of this thesis in contrast to reductive economic positivism (2.5). As should 
seem clear, this characterization of economic positivism is closer to John Neville Keynes’ 
approach than to Friedman’s argument. This point will be crucial later, when I address the 
problems of circularity and microfoundations. Another important point is this one: Even if 
positivism is sometimes understood in terms of what is expressed by 2.7, this characterization 
is just an emphasis on condition 2.6.1. Thus, it is a weaker and less complete version than 
2.6.    
We should say more about the concept of assumption. Friedman considers it mainly in a 
logical way, in the sense that assumptions can be seen as antecedents, i.e. as parts of 
hypothetical statements that, within a given language, play a certain role depending on the 
consequent statements associated with them by implication. This way of understanding the 
notion of assumption allows Friedman to support, in a logical sense, the irrelevance about 
whether an assumption is realistic or not. Just as the falsehood of a conditional does not 
logically follow from the falsehood of its antecedent, a theory cannot be discarded just 
because it rests on unrealistic assumptions. 
Friedman was particularly focused on economic policy and his thesis on the irrelevance 
of assumptions can be well illustrated considering policymaking. For example, should we 
oppose minimum wage laws, as he did? (cf. Friedman 1967) What are the consequences of 
such kind of policy on unemployment? According to a simple supply and demand model 
based on perfect competition, it may reduce unemployment, some argue. The simple model 
may be unrealistic, but, following Friedman, it should not be tested in this regard. We should 
test it regarding its implications, among which we may consider possible impacts on 
employment. 
Now, what does it mean that assumptions can be unrealistic? It is well known that 
Friedman did not use the word “unrealistic” in a clear and unambiguous manner. Ernest 
Nagel (1963) distinguished three different senses that are relevant to understand Friedman’s 
defense of the irrelevance of assumptions: An assumption may be rendered as unrealistic a) 
because it fails to describe some object exhaustively; b) because it is highly improbable on 
the basis of actual evidence; or c) because it is an idealization and, as such, cannot be seen as 
applicable to any actual set of objects (also, cf. Mäki 2004; Ng 2016). Although we can agree 
that this distinction is crucial for a rigorous defense of the irrelevance thesis, for the present 
purposes it is not. I will simply accept it as sound in its general form, having in mind that the 
notion of assumption is understood mainly in a logical sense. The acceptance of this thesis is 
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important because it supports the positivist idea that a theory should be evaluated on the basis 
of its empirical contrastability. Some assumptions may not be true regarding the actual, 
empirical world. But taking them into account may help to contrast a theory with the actual, 
empirical world. However, as I would like to show, the irrelevance thesis is not enough for 
an appropriate positivistic account of economics, having in mind the general formulation of 
positivism proposed above (2.6). 
 
 
3. Economic growth 
 
After pointing out some notions related to economic positivism and positivism in general, I 
will, in this and in the following sections, get into some philosophical problems related to the 
concept of growth and to the foundations of macroeconomics. The notion of growth is one 
of the main topics of neoclassical macroeconomics. Its relevance is associated with the ways 
in which it relates normative and positive economics. As already mentioned and as should 
become clearer later, the relation between both will vary depending on the economic 
approach that one adopts.  
Friedman’s thesis about the irrelevance of unrealistic assumptions did not have as much 
direct influence on economic theory as on economic methodology. However, his thesis of 
irrelevance mirrors very faithfully neoclassical positivist perspectives on growth. Friedman’s 
direct contributions to economic theory were mainly on monetary policy, inflation and 
employment. Of course, these areas are linked to economic growth, but indirectly. Anyway, 
a study of Friedman’s viewpoints on growth is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, I will 
consider some epistemological implications of the irrelevance thesis and suggest ways to 
tackle certain issues associated with it and with neoclassical economic growth in general.  
Mainstream models of economic growth are the ones developed by the neoclassical school 
and are based on a function of the following general form (cf. Solow 1957):  
 
(3.1) Production function.  Y = f(K, L) 
 
Here, Y represents output, K represents quantity of capital, L represents labor and f is a 
production function. It is important to mention that f should satisfy the condition of 
diminishing marginal returns, which can be characterized as follows: 
 
(3.2) Diminishing marginal returns. For an agent, the marginal utility of a good decreases 
when the quantity of that good increases. 
 
I will not put special focus on this condition now. It should be mentioned, however, that it 
also takes the form of a key principle in microeconomics, particularly in price theory (cf. 
Marshall 1890). As will be clear later, the notion of price grounds one of the main conflicts 
within neoclassical economic theory. 
Considering economic growth, let us keep in mind the positivist idea that a good theory 
must have high predictive power with regard to a certain class of phenomena. Whether or not 
its assumptions are realistic remains irrelevant (2.3). Under this principle, the definitions of 
the concepts of capital and labor, as well as the relations between them, are not important for 
the explanation provided by the production function. And neoclassical economists seem to 
have a clear explanandum in mind, namely, growth. How do we explain that some economies 
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grow more or faster than others? All models based on the structure presented in (3.1) assume 
that capital and labor are main factors that should be involved in any explanans motivated by 
questions of that kind. But what is capital? And what is labor? According to the positivist 
perspective characterized above, it does not really matter. In principle, we could construct a 
good theory of economic growth based on poorly defined or unrealistic concepts of capital 
and labor. As long as the theory has acceptable predictive power, unrealistic assumptions and 
definitions should be considered to be harmless.  
Here is, again, the main idea of Friedman’s argument: Theoretical assumptions can be 
considered as premises in a more general, deductive structure, and, thus, as antecedents of 
propositional conditionals. So, just as the truth of an antecedent does not guarantee the truth 
of the consequent, the truth of the assumptions within an economic theory is irrelevant for 
the correctness of its predictions.  
The thesis for the irrelevance of assumptions (2.3) is, in certain terms, plausible, although 
Friedman’s argument to support it lacks clarity at some places and may be regarded as 
inconclusive. As Ernest Nagel argues (1963), Friedman is not clear enough about crucial 
notions such as the notion of theory or the notion of unrealistic assumption. A somehow 
similar observation is made by Uskali Mäki (2004), who argues that Friedman mixes and 
confounds concepts and perspectives that should be considered carefully for the sake of a 
better argumentation regarding economic issues. Developing another kind of criticism, 
Daniel Hausman (1984) claims that the realism of assumptions is important for a broader 
understanding of economics. 
Since I am now interested in the critical analysis of economic growth, it seems appropriate 
to focus on the ways in which instances of growth models can be reformulated as 
propositional arguments. After doing this, a second step will be to consider the soundness of 
these arguments. It can be shown, as we will see, that one of the main possibly vicious 
argumentative features that one can associate with neoclassical growth models is their 
circularity (cf. Robinson 1953; Cohen & Harcourt 2003). I will argue that such a circularity 
provides good reasons to criticize models of economic growth without rejecting the 
irrelevance of assumptions thesis. In a certain sense, I will criticize a part of mainstream 
positive economics from a positivist perspective (or a perspective that remains as positivist 
as possible). In the pars construens of this paper (sections 5, 6 & 7), I will suggest that a 
fruitful way to tackle the issue of circularity can be found by focusing on the 
microfoundations problem.  
 
 
4. The problem of circularity 
 
A widely discussed problem of neoclassical growth models is the issue of circularity. The 
issue can be characterized as follows (cf. Cohen & Harcourt 2003; Kincaid 2009):  
 
(4.1) Circularity of growth models. 
4.1.1 To obtain a production function for (an aggregate of) diverse goods, outputs and 
inputs cannot be measured in physical terms. 
4.1.2 They must be measured in value. 
4.1.3 To have a value measure for diverse goods implies that there is a price for capital 
and for a distribution of income. 




In order to grasp the circularity more clearly, we have to focus on price theory (cf. Marshall 
1890). Very roughly, neoclassical price theory is based on supply and demand as main 
conditions, such that the following holds: 
 
(4.2) Price. Under certain fixed conditions, the price of a particular good increases with 
the increase of demand and decreases with the increase of supply. Also, given a fixed 
price, the relation between supply and demand of a particular good reaches an equilibrium 
at some point.  
 
So, here is the circularity: The explanation of a given outcome depends on valuations of 
capital and labor, but, at the same time, those valuations depend on what the factors can 
produce. As Alfred Marshall claims, “the chief demand for capital arises from its 
productiveness” (1890, p. 68).  
Just for the sake of illustrating the circularity problem, consider this proposition, which 
can appear as a prediction obtained from different growth models under specified conditions: 
 
(4.3) China’s economy grew by 6.9% in 2017. 
 
It may be noted, before moving forward in the argument, that this should be taken as part of 
a general exemplification of the theoretical issue under consideration—i.e. the problem of 
circularity—and not as a particular case under study. The main point here is not about China’s 
economy, of course. 
Again, since I am trying to stay within a positivist perspective, I accept that it does not 
matter whether a description like 4.3 is realistic or not for the evaluation of neoclassical 
growth theory. By doing this, the reference of “China’s economy” can be any entity or set of 
entities postulated in the modeling process. If the model requires to think of China’s economy 
as a computational data set, let that be. The main question here is how we should understand 
a predicate like “grew by 6.9%”. Let Y1 and Y2 represent China’s total production in 2016 
and in 2017 respectively. Thus, we can reformulate 4.3 as follows:  
 
(4.4) The percentage ratio between Y1 and Y2 is 6.9%. 
 
Now, both Y1 and Y2 should be defined on the basis of the general structure of production 
functions in terms of capital and labor (3.1). The sense of Y1 as well as the sense of Y2 is 
clear. But as stated in the second premise of the circularity problem (4.1), to obtain Y1 or Y2 
we need to measure them in values. The same holds for the corresponding inputs. This means 
that there are expressions used in the theory whose denotations are obscurely determinable. 
Let us just focus on Y2 and symbolize China’s invested capital and labor during 2017 as 
K2 and L2 respectively. And let lowercase letters represent the values taken by each variable, 
such that the expression of the form A = a symbolizes the fact that A takes the value a. Thus, 
considering growth theory, we arrive at the following:  
 
(4.5) K2 = k2 (together with L2 = l2) explains Y2 = y2. 
 




(4.6) Y2 = y2 explains K2 = k2. 
 
This should make the circularity problem clearer. Considering 4.5 and 4.6, the particular 
values of K both explain and are explained by the particular values of Y. The positivist 
concepts of capital, production, labor and growth remain without a clear definition, even 
when conceptual clarity is one of the aims of positivism (2.6.3). Note that the issue arises 
within the framework of positive economics and, therefore, respecting the irrelevance of 
assumptions principle. The recalcitrant question for the defenders of the neoclassical 
program, then, is whether their methodological positivist principles deserve to be considered 
as constituting a good example of positivism.  
We should also note that this issue can be generalized as a criticism against reductionist 
empiricism in general. Any positivist account according to which some strict notion of 
experience is supposed to be the only crucial methodological basis for the evaluation of 
theories may have problems of circularity similar to the ones indicated in this section. This 
does not mean, however, that positivism is a completely nonsensical or contradictory 
approach that presupposes, thus, an impossible discourse. As we will show, a more open 
empiricist perspective can be very fruitful. 
 
 
5. The problem of microfoundations 
 
As shown in the last section, there are predictions obtained from neoclassical growth models 
whose content can only be determined, on pain of circularity, if certain variables are also 
assumed in some respects as explananda of what they initially tend to explain. In this way, 
we have reasons to criticize a part of positivist economic theory from a positivist stance, i.e. 
considering its empirical consequences rather than the plausibility of its assumptions. Note 
that my argument is not mainly about the theory-ladeness of experiments, but about a special 
theoretical and conceptual circularity within mainstream economics. How this particular 
circularity may depend on some general theory-ladeness could be the topic for another work, 
but it is not part of the main issue here. 
Note also that what we can consider as a negative aspect of some economic growth models 
is not about the deducibility of their predictions, but about the circularity associated with 
them. Now, is this a vicious circularity? Which features should a good economic theory have 
in order to tackle the problem of circularity? I will propose some ways to approach these 
questions in what follows. 
As pointed out, price theory is crucial to understand the circularity problem related to 
growth: Capital and labor explain production, but production explains the values (prices) of 
capital and labor. Now, it should be emphasized that this is not a tension within economic 
growth theory in isolation, but a tension between macroeconomics and microeconomics. On 
the one hand, price theory seeks to account for the behavior of individual rational agents and 
is thus part of microeconomics. On the other hand, economic growth theory accounts for the 
behavior of economies and is, as such, part of macroeconomics. Considering this, I think that 
the problem of circularity should be tackled having in mind the theoretical and 
epistemological relations between micro- and macroeconomics. The analysis of these 
relations leads us immediately to the so-called problem of microfoundations, which can be 




Microfoundations problem. How do the actions of individual rational agents determine 
high-level properties of an economy that they constitute, considering that these macro 
properties also determine the actions of individuals? 
 
The first part of the issue can be considered from two angles: a) In which sense are 
macroeconomic processes, such as growth, reducible to collective behavior at the low-level? 
b) How do macro processes arise from the latter? The second part of the problem can be 
expressed as a problem of downward causation, i.e. in which way can we characterize that 
high-level economic states have causal power over the behavior of individual agents?  
Considering these aspects of the microfoundations problem, it seems more than 
appropriate to approach it in the light of the notion of emergent property. Very roughly, the 
property of a system is emergent if it arises from the complex interactions of the system’s 
constituents but is at the same time irreducible to them (cf. Broad 1925; Alexander 1927; El-
Hani & Pereira 2000). 
The next sections will be focused on the following: First, I will consider a characterization 
of emergence that may allow us to tackle the microfoundations problem. Then, I conjecture 




6. Contextual emergence  
 
The rough characterization of emergence given at the end of the last section involves a 
conundrum in its very basis: How can a property be determined and undetermined at the same 
time by the constituents of the system in which it arises? While reductionists dismiss the 
notion of emergence trying to explain how macro properties can be determined by micro 
properties, dualists do it proposing that some macro properties are irreducible in some 
absolute sense. I would like to explore the possibility that emergent properties are indeed 
reducible and irreducible at the same time. But, of course, as it stands, this is a contradiction. 
However, the notion of an epistemic context, mentioned earlier, allows us to escape 
incoherence: 
 
(6.1) Epistemic context. An epistemic context is a structure <Q, R>, where Q is a set of 
(descriptive, normative and/or nominative) expressions, ordered by a set of relevance 
functions R. 
 
Epistemic contexts are given within the course of some investigation and, thus, are ways of 
representing pragmatic aspects of contingent, human endeavors. This justifies the inclusion 
of normative and nominative expressions besides descriptions. In general, investigation does 
not only involve descriptions, i.e. positive items, but also attitudes associated with how we 
approach phenomena, how we attend to objects and how we evaluate them. It is usual to find 
out that norms, attitudes and phenomena are very hard to measure, quantify or translate to a 
positive language. They often oscillate between the inaccessible and the arbitrary. And we 
might agree, but this does not mean that considerations about non-descriptive items have to 
be eliminated from theory, as strict economic positivists seem to promote.  
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We may characterize now the notion of an emergent property as follows, where K is a general 
epistemic context from which we can refer to a set of contexts Ci that we may call sub-
contexts: 
 
(6.2) Contextual emergence. According to a context K, a set of states, symbolized by E, is 
emergent from another set of states, symbolized as B, just in case 
6.2.1 there is a context C1 in which E is reduced to B,  
6.2.2 there is a context C2 in which E is irreducible to B and 
6.2.3 there is a context C3, according to which E involves observed, novel properties that 
are correlated with an abrupt change of complexity involved in B. 
 
On this basis, we can also understand an emergent process as a process in which a certain 
change of complexity occurs, associated with a corresponding emergent property, and an 
emergent state as a state that involves an emergent property. Note that this definition of 
emergence is not only applicable to issues regarding the relations between micro- and 
macroeconomic phenomena, but to any complex system (or set of complex systems) in which 
high-level properties are hard to explain or to predict on the basis of its low-level properties.  
The notion of complexity, included in condition 6.2.3, is crucial if we want to require an 
understanding of emergent properties not as mere bogus, phantasmagory properties, but as 
properties associated with physical ones and also with structural changes at the physical level. 
Complexity also expresses the point that emergent processes arise from numerous and 
diverse interactions. Somehow, it keeps us away from dualism. Emergent properties are 
neither just put there nor appear as completely separated entities. This is particularly 
important with regard to economics. Is capital, for instance, just something that we can 
aggregate to a system? Or is it rather something that forms within a system, given various 
changes related to the different complex processes that constitute it? The notion of emergence 
motivates us to put more emphasis on the second question. However, note that it does not 
force us to reject the first as unimportant. According to the characterization just proposed, 
emergent properties not only can be understood reductively, but also must be understood in 
this way. This does not imply a surrender to reductionism. Although the account accepts 
reductions, they do not count as the main relations that explain emergence. 
It is worth to recall that John Stuart Mill (1843) developed one of the first notions close 
to emergence, explaining that some effects of organized bodies are fundamentally different 
from the effects produced by their components. Thus, it is more than plausible to think that 
he assumed this kind of relation when he claimed, for instance, that capital arises from 
accumulation or that profit arises from the productive power of labor (Mill 1948). 
Furthermore, it is crucial to consider how these ideas influenced Karl Marx’s theory (cf. 
Balassa 1959; Shoul 1965; Evans 1989). 
Considering context-dependence, the Fregean distinction between sense and reference 
may be important here (Frege 1892). The idea can be put in a quite simple way: The sense, 
i.e. the cognitive or theoretical meaning of E varies from context to context. And its reference, 
namely its ontological meaning, is determined (or postulated) depending on each context. 
This allows us to refer one single expression to different, sometimes incompatible ontologies.  
The relation between two contexts K and C, where C is a sub-context of K, is not 
extensional, but intensional. This means that C is not necessarily a subset of K. However, it 
is important that we can mean something about C from the perspective of K. In other words, 
some expressions of K may have their reference in C, while their sense may be determined 
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depending on the role each expression plays within K itself. This allows us to consider 
expressions for an emergent state (E) within different contexts and, at the same time, relating 
those expressions inter-contextually. For instance, we may consider a neoclassical, 
reductionistic sense for the expression “capital” within some context C1 and also a non-
reductionistic sense, within a different context C2, characterizing a classical notion focused 
on the organic aspects of capital. Both contexts may i) refer to each other, ii) be associated 
as sub-contexts with a third context K and even iii) refer together to a same set of entities 
within a postulated ontology (say, a sociological ontology). These kinds of relations are 
crucial to understand certain economic states as emergent, according to my proposal. 
Essentially, the contextualist strategy applied here can be considered as part of a broader 
framework, which includes, among others, epistemic and linguistic versions of contextualism 
(cf. DeRose 2009; Kompa 2010; Bouchard 2014). Thus, the general form of the present 
argument does not hang necessarily upon the specific cases regarding economics studied in 
this work. 
Furthermore, reference relations allow us to characterize the reflexivity of economic 
systems in terms of self-reference. An economic system S can be seen as reflexive when it 
can be represented as a general context K, on the basis of which we can refer to another 
context K’ that represents S in a different sense. I will not focus on the notion of reflexivity 
in more detail here (cf. Gay 2009; Schliesser 2011; Davis & Hands 2018). However, it may 
settle a ground to argue in favor of the relevance of assumptions. An economic assumption 
can be treated as more or less realistic than another depending on how they are projected to 
the ontologies of the most general and self-referential economic contexts. For example, even 
if assumptions regarding fully rational agents may work on restricted contexts, they may or 
may not be projected to the ontologies of a more general, self-referential economic system. 
And either way will have important repercussions on how the system develops. The 
unrealisticness of assumptions is important in this sense. 
It should be mentioned that the present proposal can be considered as an account 
concerning scientific inquiry in general, such that my argument about taking different 
contexts simultaneously does not depend necessarily on the issues of microfoundations and 
circularity associated with economic growth theory. Emergence can be described with regard 
to different levels of explanation, not only to the social level. Various related notions of 
contextual emergence have been applied to physical, biological and cognitive processes (cf. 
Atmanspacher 2015; Fuentes 2014; Van Gulick 2001). 
Now that I have proposed a framework, in the next session I will discuss how it may be 
applied to tackle the problems already characterized, without falling in vicious explanatory 
circularities and staying closer to what positivism should be (2.6) than what neoclassical 
theorists seem to think it is. 
 
 
7. Discussion: Microfoundations, aggregation and emergent macroproperties 
 
It is no surprise that defenders of the neoclassical doctrine try to account for the 
microfoundations problem in a reductive manner, considering that their production functions 
operate over variables that simply acquire their values depending on microeconomic 
processes regarding price. These are some of the common assumptions that pave the way for 




a) Hyperrationality. All agents act maximizing their utilities and on the basis of perfect 
information. 
b) Agent aggregation. Given hyperrationality, we may add the activity of all firms, 
consumers and workers in order to treat them as a single variable (for example, labor as 
input for a production function). 
c) Homogeneity of capital. All items considered as capital can be treated as homogeneous 
thanks to their valuation based on price theory. 
d) Capital aggregation. Given the homogeneity of capital, we can treat all capital as a 
single variable. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions, some macro properties are just aggregates of micro 
properties. Now, while emergent properties are usually understood as properties that are more 
than the sum of its parts, it seems plausible (if not obvious) to take any neoclassical strategy 
based on aggregation as an attempt of treating macroeconomic properties as mere sums of 
their parts.  
The microfoundations program based on the mentioned assumptions does not seek to 
provide explanations of how economic high-level features (such as growth) emerge from 
interactions at the low level. Given the relevance of price theory within neoclassical theory, 
the aim of providing microfoundations is rather associated with considering aggregation 
issues as serious and tackling them in ways that may tend to eliminate macroeconomic terms 
in favor of an economic theory based on what we now understand as microeconomics (cf. 
Lucas 1987). Note how this reductionist stance is at odds with the condition of scientific 
unity, proposed earlier for a general account of positivism (2.6.4).  
As explained earlier, neoclassical growth theory implies an explanatory circularity with 
regard to the notion of production and its valuation. Roughly, the problem can be considered 
in the light of this question: Do supply and demand explain growth or does growth (in 
particular, profitability) explain supply and demand?  
Capital and labor get their values through supply and demand relations, described by the 
theory of price, and having certain specific values, they explain growth, under a given 
production function. But for the same reason, i.e. since the very valuations of capital and 
labor depend on (and are explained by) their expected profitability, they also depend on 
production, more precisely on price-related expectations thereof. 
Again, is this a vicious circularity? It would not have to be, if we adopted the reductionist 
neoclassical program. In a radical reductionist perspective, capital, labor and production are 
just epiphenomena. They do not have the “real” causal power with which we could explain 
economic processes, because every economic process operates as a set of relations based on 
supply, demand and optimization. So, according to this view, there is no vicious circularity 
because there is no circularity at all. 
It would be a vicious circularity, however, if we adopted a dualist perspective, i.e. a view 
that maintained micro- and macroeconomic processes as separated as possible. This also 
seems to be the stance of mainstream economics sometimes. But when economists depart 
from dualism and accept that microeconomics and macroeconomics are focused on the same 
system of phenomena, they come to what we understand as emergence. As an example of 
this, let us consider one of Paul Krugman’s contributions. Krugman has made a great effort 
to understand economies as irreducible complex systems. In this regard, he introduces the 




(7.1) Spatial economy. A spatial economy is a system constituted by agents (firms, for 
example) to which we attribute certain states, namely locations at given times. These 
components interact in multiple ways, depending on needs and resources. Interesting 
patterns of self-organization arise from these interactions. 
 
Note that from this perspective, we do not have to deny that production depends on capital 
and labor. We could explain in a reductive manner, through some production function, why 
a given economy is growing at a certain rate, aggregating the labor and capital power 
associated with the set of agents that constitute the system. For that matter, we could obviate 
their locations. However, by considering the spatial features of an economy we can also 
explain processes such as the concentration and mobility of factors. These processes are 
crucial for an understanding of production, capital and labor that is undoubtedly richer than 
reductionist alternatives. 
We can think of Krugman’s notion of spatial economy as a case that supports the 
characterization of emergence given earlier. Take again, for example, the observation that 
China’s economy grew by 6.9% in 2017. Following definition 6.2, we are able to express 
that China’s growth is an emergent process that arises from the interactions and motions of 
its components, as follows: 
 
(7.2) China’s growth as an emergent process. First, we have reductive contexts that seek 
to explain that phenomenon. Second, we have non-reductive contexts that may only point 
to rough relations between the phenomenon and the interactions at the micro-level or 
according to which China’s growth may seem surprising. And third, we have epistemic 
contexts in which abrupt fluctuations of complexity may indicate correlation patterns 
between China’s growth and China seen as a spatial economy. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that this proposal is not strange to positivism. It is data-based, 
it is explanatory, it allows for simple predictive models and it is even compatible with 
Friedman’s principle of irrelevance: Whether the ontologies that one may postulate on the 
basis of a reductive context are idealizations or too abstract or plainly false does not matter. 
But we have to add: It does not matter, as long as we also take other contexts into account on 
the basis of which we may arrive at a broader understanding of economics. This is ver far 
from Friedman’s view of positive economics.  
We cannot just say that the realism of the assumptions is irrelevant as long as they support 
models with acceptable predictive and explanatory power. We have to consider other 
epistemic criteria, such as the comprehensibility of an economic model, its relation to models 
of other disciplines and even the possible ethical (not just explanatory) consequences of their 
applications.  
The main problem with Friedman’s positivism that I want to point out is not about its 
plausibility, but about its methodological narrowness. According to Friedman, economics is 
only about events, not about evaluation (cf. 1953; 1967). By contrast, the concept of 
epistemic context that I assume here involves not only descriptions and explanations of 
events, but also normative statements of different sorts.  
Let K be an epistemic context from the perspective of which we assess some economic 
state E as emergent. Recall that, according to the definition proposed here, there must be 
three sub-contexts to which we may refer from K and on the basis of which we may explain 
E in different ways. Context K may involve different normative and methodological criteria 
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that may drive the selection of those sub-contexts. Should we not include ethical and social 
criteria as well to do that? The answer is simple: We should include them, given the nature 
of the discipline and the types of phenomena it seeks to explain and control. But what about 
physics? How do they manage to offer their highly-explanatory models without focusing 
much on ethics?—an orthodox may insist. Well, as long as the phenomena and the relevant 
context do not require it, ethical considerations may be negligible. Perhaps there is no big 
issue in giving a reductionistic explanation of motion at some scale in order to explain certain 
macroscopic phenomena, such as sea levels, for instance, mainly considering gravitational 
and rotational forces. But, again, nothing stops us from considering other factors, such as 
pollution. And this is how contexts in which things turn normative gain relevance.   
The positivistic features of economics, i.e. its empirical aspects, can be characterized 
following Otto Neurath’s view on scientific progress in economics (cf. 1911): 
 
(7.3) Economic progress. Progress of economic theory is possible when abstractions are 
obtained from empirical complexes, which can be combined and lead to further 
investigations. What we render as empirical is a matter of principle. 
 
These aspects of scientific progress can be found, of course, in other areas. And I would like 
to put emphasis on the idea that the notions of epistemic context and contextual emergence 
could be applied not only within particular scientific fields, to establish relations between 
separate research projects, but also to consider inter-theoretic and inter-disciplinary relations. 
And it is also important to emphasize that contextual aspects of progress are fundamental in 
economics. Neurath put it quite well:  
 
“[I]t is possible to leave measurable quantities behind and yet do exact science. Since in 
political economy we are able to symbolically represent systems of organisations it might 
also be possible that other branches of the so-called social sciences are amenable to exact 
treatment. This would be a large step towards the creation of a universal science. It is a 
major task to render the whole order of life as transparent as possible and to reduce as 
many relations as possible to simpler ones. […] The biggest difficulty consists in isolating 
the separate investigations as far as possible without losing perspective on the other 
contexts. One has to be aware at all times whether it is appropriate to retain the entire 
system of the theory and account for some fact by auxiliary hypotheses or whether it is 
more appropriate to rearrange the entire system. This is not always strictly adhered to. All 
too often the separate sciences forget the larger contexts and go beyond their field of 
competence by drawing conclusions about the whole state and the entire social order from 
a small number of premises that had been established for just a few problems.  On  the  
other  hand, it is not rare that in discussing a certain concrete context absolutely vital 
circumstances are not examined and that instead general ideas are invoked in some vague 
way (the rhythm of social life etc.). This phenomenon is not only observable in  political  
economy  but  also, for instance, in probability theory, occasionally in biology and in other 
places too.” (1910/2004, p. 286) 
 
Data obtained from price fluctuations can be considered as empirical from a neoclassical, 
and even from a contextualist perspective. But they can also be part of an empirical complex, 
constructed from observations of different sorts, abstractions and combinations thereof. 
Thus, going back to our example, the fact that China’s economy is growing fast is, as a matter 
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of principle, empirical. Various interests and methodological aspects shape these 
abstractions, their combinations and how we describe them. To ignore this implies not only 
ignoring the potentials of economic theory, but also ignoring crucial aspects of empiricism 





It has been argued that economic growth may be better understood on the basis of the notion 
of emergence than on the basis of the traditional, neoclassical perspective. According to such 
a perspective, growth is characterized in terms of output ratios associated with a production 
function. This functional analysis usually depends on assumptions that may seem plainly 
unrealistic, e.g. the assumption that economies are closed systems or that capital and labor 
are independent. Now, rather than criticizing this kind of models for their unrealisticness, 
one can criticize them for implying a certain circularity (section 4). As shown, the problem 
of circularity is an aspect of the vastly debated microfoundations problem (section 5). In 
order to tackle this problem, it is here suggested that, instead of adopting a simple form of 
reductionist positivism or of dualism (which may also lead to a lot of unclarities), we can 
focus on an emergentist view based on the notion of epistemic context. As pointed out, this 
strategy is compatible with traditional positivist principles about the relevance of experience 
and explanation of facts. However, it goes further, involving considerations about 
normativity, complexity and even about what turns out to be unexplainable within a particular 
economic inquiry. 
The present proposal implies three main contributions to the philosophy of economics. (I 
would like to thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing on these consequences of the 
proposal and for helping me formulate them in a clear way, considering their impact within 
the philosophy of economics.) First, I move the focus of the debate about positive economics 
from considerations of theories seen in isolation to considerations of interrelated projects of 
inquiry, trying to argue for an analytical frame in which epistemic aspects of individual 
theories and research projects must be assessed in reference to wider sets of ongoing research 
projects. This first contribution can also be seen as an argument about the importance of the 
collective aspects of scientific research, inviting us to reconsider the concept of explanation 
as well as the role that individuals play within a wider, ongoing system of collective inquiry. 
Second, and more specifically, I argue that local considerations of validity, which have 
been traditionally central in debates about positive economics, can be loosened by moving 
from a focus on individual theories to considerations of families of interrelated theories and 
models. So, how realistic are the assumptions of a given economic model may not always 
matter. But we should have always in mind the explanatory, normative and observational 
restrictions of the epistemic context in which they operate. Irrelevance of assumptions may 
be valid in its contextually limited methodological domain, as long as we also consider a 
pluralistic and broad view on economics.  
And third, I think that the present proposal significantly moves the discussion about 
methodology in the philosophy of economics forward, where simplistic debates about 
methodological collectivism and methodological individualism seem perennial. I suggest a 
novel and productive way of integrating both projects, which allows us to retain the 
acceptance of their contributions, limitations and autonomy.  
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The second and third mentioned contributions, which imply important advancements in our 
understanding of multi-level economic phenomena, promote a pluralistic and open, positivist 
philosophical spirit, a spirit that is perhaps needed today more than ever in economics. 
Having this notion of epistemic openness in mind, the specific aspects of the philosophy of 
economics approached in this work are also particularly relevant in the sense that they help 
us make an argument about the nature of science and social epistemology in general. The 
pluralistic aspects implied by my perspective are, in certain relevant ways, harmonizable with 
the account proposed by Victoria Chick and Sheila Dow (2005), which is based on the 
concept of an open formal system. 
Some crucial issues remain, though. How should oppennes be regulated? Institutional 
restrictions depend on networks of power relations, on the basis of which material and 
theoretical developments are fixed and transformed. So, the ways in which economic 
processes are described according to a mainstream are themselves determined by economic 
processes. (But does the term “economic process” preserve its meaning in this last sentence?). 
How should we interpret the idea of coherence in condition 2.6.4 then? It seems that it cannot 
be a simple, classical, first order coherence, if we admit that social processes always involve 
struggle and clashes of different forces. If our main interests are focused on life and self-
organized coexistence between different individuals and species at a global level, then our 
notion of coherence should accommodate to those interests. And some notions, like the 
notion of a rational agent, for example, may not be fundamental there, i.e. they may not 
constitute a basis for emergence relations that are deemed relevant in that context. A very 
different case is where interests are focused on control, exploitation of the environment and 
accumulation of wealth. Not only a different notion of coherence will set the structure 
according to such a context, but it will be at some point an imposed coherence as well.  
The idea of emergence that I defend in this work is flexible enough to distinguish between 
those different types of contexts. It is not restricted, like other concepts of emergence, to the 
domain of the natural sciences, because a lot will depend on how far we are able (or allowed) 
to generalize and on how sensitive we can be about our interests and of others. Considering 
all this, it may be questioned whether being positivist is a characteristic of my criticism at 
all. Well, it may not be positivist in the dogmatic sense, but the proposal still demands strong 
conditions regarding empirical adequacy and logical analysis. It is not that a positivist stance 
is strictly required to solve the problems of circularity and of microfoundations, but it is a 
stance that could be chosen to confront them. Anyhow, the correct positive stance to tackle 
them is not what neoclassical economists call “positive economics”, as I wanted to argue. 
So-called positive conomics is a stance that rather ignores and avoids those problems. Thus, 
my proposal is a way to recall that reductionist positivism, in general, and positivist 
economics, in particular, fall short in grasping important notions and tackling some crucial 
philosophical problems in the social sciences. As I tried to show, this can be done by instead 
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